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THE NEW FORMALISM IN UNITED
STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
JACK L. GOLDSMITH*
This article analyzes familiar foreign relations law doc-
trines through the lens of rules and standards. The main but
not exclusive focus is the political question doctrine, the act of
state doctrine, and dormant foreign affairs preemption. Prior
to the 1960s, courts applied these doctrines in a highly for-
malistic fashion.1 Beginning in the 1960s, courts embraced a
more instrumental and functional approach to these doctrines.
Since the end of the Cold War, courts have once again begun to
craft the doctrines in formalistic terms, although this "new"
formalism differs in justification, and sometimes in content,
from the pre-Cold War approach. This article identifies and
analyzes this new formalism in United States foreign relations
law.
At first glance the political question doctrine, the act of
state doctrine, and dormant foreign affairs preemption appear
to have little in common. The political question and act of
state doctrines implicate horizontal relations between federal
courts and the federal political branches. These doctrines con-
template a modest role of abstention for federal courts. They
are often criticized as an abdication of the judiciary's constitu-
tional duty "to say what the law is."2 By contrast, dormant
foreign affairs preemption implicates vertical relations be-
tween the federal government (most directly, federal courts)
and the states. This doctrine contemplates an active role for
federal courts in foreign relations cases. Federal courts not
only adjudicate the merits of these cases, they also preempt
state law and sometimes legislate rules of decision.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Thanks to Curt Brad-
ley, Beth Garrett, Jill Hasday, Paul Stephan, Cass Sunstein, Adrian Vermeule,
and G. Edward White for very helpful comments, Vidya Atre for research assis-
tance, and the Arnold and Frieda Shure Research Fund for financial support.
1. As I make clear below, for purposes of this article I equate formalism
with rule-based decision making. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE
L.J. 509 (1988).
2. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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Despite surface differences, these foreign relations doc-
trines have much in common. They are all judge-made doc-
trines applied primarily by federal courts. They all have the
same ostensible purpose: to ensure political branch hegemony
in foreign relations. They all respond to the problem that
arises when government officials other than those in the fed-
eral political branches cause foreign relations controversy by
acts not prohibited by enacted federal law. And, I shall argue,
all three doctrines have, until recently, involved a similar func-
tional standard of analysis. I call this standard the foreign re-
lations effects test. Under the foreign relations effects test,
federal courts in their discretion identify and assess the for-
eign relations interests of the United States and make predic-
tions about the effects of certain acts (by a federal court or a
state) on these interests. They typically do this in the absence
of guidance from the political branches. On the basis of such
an independent foreign policy analysis, courts accommodate
these interests-through abstention, special interpretive can-
ons, or preemption-as they best see fit.
I shall argue that the foreign relations effects test rests on
questionable assumptions about the nature of foreign relations
law and the proper role of federal courts. The effects test pur-
ports to protect political branch prerogatives in foreign rela-
tions. But it has the ironic consequence of enhancing the
federal courts' power to make foreign relations law at the ex-
pense of the political branches. This is easiest to see with
dormant foreign affairs preemption, which casts the federal
judiciary as an independent source bf discretionary federal for-
eign relations law. It is no less true of the act of state and po-
litical question doctrines, which enable courts under the guise
of judicial modesty to alter the scope of federal foreign rela-
tions law. The political branches cannot plausibly be thought
to have authorized these forms of judicial action. There is lit-
tle reason to think they need such assistance. And in any
event, federal courts are not good at providing this assistance
under the effects test, which requires them to identify and ac-
commodate U.S. foreign relations interests on a case-by-case
basis. Federal court incompetence in this respect explains why
the doctrines supported by the effects test are applied in a no-
toriously inconsistent and (seemingly) unprincipled fashion.
The new formalism in nonconstitutional foreign relations
cases seeks to correct these deficiencies. The new formalism is
1396 [Vol. 70
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not a return to conceptualism. Nor is it an attempt to mask
value judgments by reference to legal materials. The new for-
malism is instead best viewed as a pragmatic approach to judi-
cial foreign relations doctrines based on an analysis of
comparative institutional competence and likely political
branch response to various judicial decision-making strategies.
The new formalism rejects the case-by-case, judge-made for-
eign relations effects test. It aims to protect political branch
prerogatives in nonconstitutional foreign relations cases
through the use of rules rather than standards. The best of
these rules encourage the federal political branches-the
branches of the federal government with superior competence
and a superior democratic pedigree-to clarify the content of
U.S. foreign relations law.
This article identifies and analyzes the new formalism in
U.S. foreign relations law. Part I introduces the general prob-
lem redressed by the doctrines analyzed in this paper: what to
do when federal courts and states take actions not prohibited
by enacted federal law that produce foreign relations contro-
versies. Part II describes the antiformalistic approach to this
problem that prevailed during the bulk of the Cold War. Part
III outlines the many difficulties with this regime as a partial
explanation for the recent revival of formalism in the foreign
relations context. Part IV describes the new formalism and
sketches a framework for analyzing its strengths and weak-
nesses. A brief conclusion follows.
I. THE GENERAL PROBLEM
Conventional wisdom offers a functional justification for
political branch hegemony in foreign relations. 3 The executive
branch dominates the conduct of foreign relations because of
"the unity of the office, its capacity for secrecy and despatch,
and its superior sources of information; to which it should be
added the fact that it is always on hand and ready for action,
whereas the houses of Congress are in adjournment much of
the time."4 Only the President can continuously, coherently,
3. I do not agree with this conventional wisdom in all its details, but I set it
out here as a useful way to understand the special problems that inhere in the
judicial foreign relations law doctrines under study.
4. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 208 (1948).
13971999]
HeinOnline  -- 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1397 1999
1398 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
and definitively represent the nation at all times; only he can
act with initiative and secrecy, take risks, and remain flexible.
Congress too has national accountability and foreign relations
expertise. But it is too diffuse, too public, and too deliberative
to perform many foreign relations tasks. It plays a largely re-
active role in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations, exercising
the most influence when the qualities of legislation (public de-
liberation, relative immutability, comprehensiveness, and
democratic legitimacy) are most appropriate.
This functional justification for political branch hegemony
explains why federal courts and the states do not, as a general
matter, conduct U.S. foreign relations. Both lack the informa-
tion, expertise, unity, and national political accountability to
make foreign relations judgments for the nation. The states
suffer the additional problem of not reliably taking national (as
opposed to state) interests into account. Federal courts suffer
additional problems that inhere in the judicial process. They
"tend to establish rules of more-or-less general applicability,
which can only relate to the needs of foreign policy grossly, and
on the basis of assumptions and generalizations hardly conso-
nant with flexibility, currentness, and consistency."5 And
when they do "differentiate, distinguish, and make exceptions,
they-unlike the Executive-must deal in doctrines, must jus-
tify in reasoned opinion."6
Although federal courts and states do not conduct U.S.
foreign relations, they often do things not prohibited by en-
acted federal law that adversely affect U.S. foreign relations.
Federal courts can do this, for example, when they apply a fed-
eral statute extraterritorially, 7 or interpret a treaty s or adjudi-
cate the validity of a foreign act of state.9 States too can cause
foreign relations controversy when, for instance, they stop pur-
chasing from disfavored countries, 10 or execute an alien, 1 or
5. Louis Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sab-
batino, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 805, 826 (1964).
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
9. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
10. See, e.g., National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287
(D. Mass. 1998).
11. See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998).
[Vol. 70
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tax a multinational corporation pursuant to a controversial
methodology. 12 There are many similar examples.
The problem analyzed in this article is how to think about
such foreign relations controversies produced by federal court
and state acts that are not prohibited by enacted federal law.
One view holds that harmonious relations with other countries
are not an absolute or overriding goal. Sometimes a judicial
decision or a state act that causes foreign relations controversy
is consistent with the wishes of the federal political branches,
or at least is the best reading of federal law. And even if fed-
eral law is underspecified and cannot plausibly be viewed to
have addressed the issues that cause the foreign relations con-
troversy, such controversy is no more serious than analogous
controversies that arise all the time from underspecification of
federal law in domestic contexts. On this view, adverse foreign
relations consequences do not justify any change in the usual
assumptions of our constitutional order that federal courts in-
terpret federal enactments in cases within their jurisdiction,
and that states can act in ways not prohibited by enacted fed-
eral law.
A different view suggests that foreign relations contro-
versy produced by federal court adjudications and state acts
evidences a problem that requires special redress. The idea
here is that such foreign relations controversy is an inherent
evil to be avoided unless the controversy-producing acts are
specifically authorized by the political branches. On this view,
foreign relations controversy is so serious as to justify a modi-
fication of the usual constitutional assumptions about judicial
review and federalism.
The remainder of the article analyzes these two views. It
is important to keep in mind throughout the analysis that the
federal political branches control the ultimate resolution of for-
eign relations controversies produced by federal courts and the
states.1 3 For example, ex ante they can specify that a federal
12. See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
13. This sentence is accurate as applied to the doctrines under considera-
tion in this paper. But of course in some respects the Constitution specifies ways
that federal courts and states can affect foreign relations that are not revisable by
the political branches. This is true, for example, when federal courts affect for-
eign relations by interpreting constitutional limits on the political branches'
power to conduct foreign relations. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (hold-
ing that a statute prohibiting display of certain signs outside foreign embassies
1999] 1399
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statute does not apply extraterritorially, or they can preempt
state efforts to impose sanctions. And ex post, they can redress
unwanted federal court adjudications or improper exercises of
state power by legislation, treaty, or executive directive. The
problem is what to make of political branch silence. Should
courts view silence to mean that the usual assumptions of our
constitutional order with regard to judicial review and feder-
alism apply fully? Or should they view silence as an under-
specification of enacted federal law based on ignorance, inertia,
inadequate foresight, or inartful drafting? If the latter, do the
foreign relations controversies caused by underspecification of
enacted federal law require special redress by federal courts?
If so, what form of redress best protects political branch pre-
rogatives?
II. THE COLD WAR FOREIGN RELATIONS EFFECTS TEST
Judges have answered these questions differently over the
years. Before the Cold War, they did so with doctrines that
were highly formalistic. By "formalistic" I simply mean that
the doctrines of federal court deference to the political
branches and the areas of federal preemption of state foreign
relations activities were couched in well-defined rules that did
not leave much room for judicial discretion. This regime
changed during the Cold War, when courts began to inquire on
a case-by-case basis whether the judicial or state act in ques-
tion harmed U.S. foreign relations. This section describes and
seeks to explain this transformation, which forms the back-
ground of the new formalism.
A. Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine in, the foreign affairs con-
text operated in a settled fashion prior to the 1960s. The Con-
stitution required courts to treat certain well-defined foreign
relations decisions by the political branches as final and bind-
ing.14 When the political branches declared war or peace, or
violates the First Amendment); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (declaring
one-house legislative veto unconstitutional in immigration context); see also U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10 (limiting state activities in certain foreign relations contexts,
some of which are not subject to congressional revision).
14. See generally Edwin D. Dickinson, International Political Questions in
1400 [Vol. 70
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asserted jurisdiction over a foreign territory, or when the
President recognized a new government, or determined a terri-
torial boundary under a treaty, or decided that a foreign gov-
ernment had the power to ratify a treaty, courts treated these
determinations as binding in the course of adjudicating other
legal issues in the case. 15 These categories of deference were
designed to protect political branch prerogatives in foreign re-
lations and, more generally, to serve U.S. foreign relations in-
terests. But these purposes were served by categorical rules
rather than case-by-case judicial inquiries into whether these
purposes would be served.
This categorical approach to political questions in the for-
eign relations context changed after Baker v. Carr,16 an appor-
tionment case. In dicta that subsequently became much more,
Baker reconceptualized the political question doctrine in func-
tional terms:
Our cases in [the foreign relations] field seem invariably to
show a discriminating analysis of the particular question
posed, in terms of the history of its management by the po-
litical branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling in
light of its nature and posture in the specific case, and of the
possible consequences ofjudicial action. 17
The Baker Court also emphasized "the necessity for discrimi-
nating inquiry into the precise facts and posture of the par-
ticular case" in determining whether the political question
doctrine applied.' 8 Consistent with this case-by-case approach,
it announced that one of six factors must be present for the
doctrine to apply.' 9 Three of these factors-the avoidance of
embarrassment to the political branches, the absence of judi-
cially manageable standards, and the need to respect coordi-
National Courts, 19 AM. J. INT'L L. 157 (1925).
15. See Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) (jurisdiction over
foreign country); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853) (ratification
power of foreign government); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 308-13
(1829) (territorial boundary determination); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3
Wheat.) 610, 633-34 (1818) (recognition of new government); United States v. One
Hundred and Twenty-Nine Packages, 27 F. Cas. 284, 288 (E.D. Mo. 1862) (No.
15,941) (declaration of war).
16. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
17. Id. at 217 (emphasis added).
18. Id.; see also id. at 211 (emphasizing the need for "case-by-case inquiry").
19. See id. at 217.
1999] 1401
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nate branches of government-have particular relevance for
foreign relations cases.
Baker brought radical but largely unnoticed change to the
political question doctrine in foreign relations. The doctrine
became much more than constitutionally compelled judicial
deference to a well-defined category of political foreign rela-
tions determinations. It additionally became a discretionary
tool for courts to abstain whenever they decide, based on an in-
dependent analysis of U.S. foreign relations, that an adjudica-
tion would harm U.S. foreign relations or the political
branches' conduct of those relations. And in another change
from the traditional approach, application of the political ques-
tion doctrine resulted in abstention from adjudication rather
than deference to a political branch judgment on a particular
issue in a case.
Consider some examples of courts employing the "effects
test" rationale for the political question doctrine. One court
declined to adjudicate a claim for declaratory and injunctive
relief under the War Powers Act arising from President
Reagan's 1987 Persian Gulf initiatives because of "the potenti-
ality of embarrassment" and because the adjudication "might
create doubts in the international community regarding the re-
solve of the United States," and because "this Court concludes
that the volatile situation in the Persian Gulf demands.., a
'single-voiced statement of the Government's views.' 20 Using a
similar rationale, courts have declined to adjudicate tort suits
arising from nuclear tests,21 requests for relief under the Hos-
20. Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333, 340 (D.D.C. 1987) (quoting in part
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)). The court distinguished an earlier deci-
sion rejecting the political question doctrine in connection with U.S. intervention
in El Salvador, see Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), affd, 720
F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), on the basis of its conclusion that "the Persian Gulf is
both more volatile and more critical to U.S. economic interests than the situation
in El Salvador." Lowry, 676 F. Supp. at 340 n.51; see also id. (noting that an "af-
firmative order might well have international ramifications that could affect U.S.
policy in the Persian Gulf' and that the "risk of multifarious pronouncements on
a sensitive matter of foreign policy is significantly higher" than in the El Salvador
case).
21. See Antolok v. United States, 873 F.2d 369, 383-84 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see
also Chaser Shipping Corp. v. United States, 649 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(dismissing on political question grounds a tort suit for damages to ship from gov-
ernmental mining of Nicaraguan harbor); Greenham Women Against Cruise Mis-
siles v. Reagan, 591 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (dismissing on political
question grounds a complaint seeking an injunction against cruise missile de-
ployment from a town in England), affd, 755 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1985).
1402 [Vol. 70
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tages Act,22 challenges to the constitutionality of foreign assis-
tance legislation,23 international human rights suits under the
Alien Tort Statute,24 mandamus suits seeking State Depart-
ment testimony,25 munitions list challenges to the Arms Export
Control Act, 26 and challenges to the enforcement policies of the
Marine Fisheries Service. 21
The foreign relations effects test is potentially much
broader than the traditional formalistic approach. Not sur-
prisingly, although the political question doctrine has fallen
into general desuetude since Baker, it is frequently applied in
the foreign relations field. 28  There have been several dozen
political question dismissals in foreign relations contexts. 2
9
These dismissals are matched by dozens of other cases that
have a significant foreign relations quotient, but are nonethe-
less adjudicated on the merits, often without discussion of the
political question doctrine.30  This apparent lack of principle
and consistency-the treatment of similar cases differently-
has led scholars to conclude that the political question doctrine
in the foreign relations context suffers from "jurisprudential
chaos."31
B. Act of State Doctrine
Just as the traditional political question doctrine required
federal courts to accept as fact certain judgments made by the
federal political branches, the traditional act of state doctrine
required federal courts to accept without question the validity
22. See Smith v. Reagan, 844 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
954 (1988).
23. See Dickson v. Ford, 521 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
954 (1975).
24. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Robb, J., concurring), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); cf. id. at 798 (Bork, J.,
concurring).
25. See Flynn v. Schultz, 748 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1984).
26. See United States v. Martinez, 904 F.2d 601 (11th Cir. 1990).
27. See Wood v. Verity, 729 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
28. See THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS 19-
20 (1992).
29. In addition to the cases cited supra notes 20-21, see, for example, the
decisions summarized in FRANCK, supra note 28, at 45-61.
30. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221
(1986); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
31. FRANCK, supra note 28, at 8.
1999] 1.403
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of foreign sovereign acts of state performed in that sovereign's
territory. For example, in 1897 the Supreme Court declined to
question the validity of a Venezuelan official's allegedly unlaw-
ful detention of a U.S. citizen in Venezuela, and dismissed the
U.S. plaintiffs tort claim on its merits.32 Like the traditional
political question doctrine, the traditional act of state doctrine
was based on easily discernible doctrinal categories, was rela-
tively simple to apply, and was relatively determinant in out-
come. Although the doctrine served the purpose of
"international comity and expediency" and was designed to en-
sure "amicable relations between governments,"33 courts ap-
peared to apply it as a rule and did not consider whether these
purposes were served in any particular case.
This understanding of the act of state doctrine changed in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino.3 4 Sabbatino held that
the act of state doctrine precluded judicial inquiry into the va-
lidity of a Cuban expropriation, even if the expropriation vio-
lated customary international law.35 In so ruling, the Court
rejected its prior categorical approach and replaced it with a
case-by-case analysis in which the key question is the extent to
which a judicial inquiry into a foreign act of state adversely af-
fects U.S. foreign relations or the Executive's ability to conduct
those relations. 36 Under this regime, the act of state doctrine
bars an adjudication if the foreign relations consequences of
the adjudication are significant. Most importantly for present
purposes, Sabbatino made clear that federal courts, and not
the Executive, are charged with the task of identifying and as-
sessing these foreign relations consequences.37
32. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897); see also Ricaud v.
American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S.
297 (1918).
33. Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 304.
34. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
35. See id. at 437.
36. See id. at 428 ("[Tjhe less important the implications of an issue are for
our foreign relations, the weaker the justification for exclusivity in the political
branches."); see also Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757
F.2d 516, 520-21 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that under Sabbatino, "the applicability of
the [act of state] doctrine depends on the likely impact on international relations
that would result from judicial consideration of the foreign sovereign's act").
37. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428, 431-32 (predicting that declaration of
invalidity of foreign act of state would "likely give offense to the expropriating
country," could "seriously interfere with negotiations being carried on by the Ex-
ecutive," and might endanger "relations with third countries which have engaged
1404 [Vol. 70
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Since Sabbatino, the act of state doctrine has been at issue
in hundreds of cases. Courts dismissed many of these cases
based on the conclusion that U.S. foreign relations interests so
required. 38 Many other cases involving foreign acts of state
that seemed to implicate significant foreign relations interests
were not dismissed.39 This apparent inconsistency-again, the
treatment of seemingly like cases differently-is one reason
that commentators have described the act of state doctrine as
being in "a state of utter confusion."40
in similar expropriations"); id. ("The dangers of such adjudication are present re-
gardless of whether the State Department has, as it did in this case, asserted that
the relevant act violated international law."); id. ("Even if the State Department
has proclaimed the impropriety of the expropriation, the stamp of approval of its
view by a judicial tribunal, however impartial, might increase any affront and the
judicial decision might occur at a time.., when such an impact would be contrary
to our national interest."); id. at 437 ("[W]e conclude that both the national inter-
est and progress toward the goal of establishing the rule of law among nations are
best served by maintaining intact the act of state doctrine in this realm of appli-
cation."). The interpretation of Sabbatino in the text follows Professor Henkin:
The Court claimed no authorization from Congress to elaborate the Act
of State doctrine, and seemed carefully to avoid seeking support for it in
Executive authority; the Court found, implied in the Constitution, an in-
dependent power for federal courts to make such law on their own
authority. It was the federal judiciary that decided that the foreign rela-
tions of the United States required the Act of State doctrine; and it was
the judiciary that was deciding, in Sabbatino, that the foreign relations
of the United States did not require (or permit) exception for acts of
state that violate international law.
LouIs HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 139 (2d
ed. 1996) (footnotes omitted).
38. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th
Cir. 1981) (holding that adverse foreign relations consequences preclude antitrust
suit against OPEC); O.N.E. Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana,
S.A., 830 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that foreign relations consequences pre-
clude adjudication of antitrust action against instrumentality of Colombian gov-
ernment).
39. See, e.g., Airline Pilots Ass'n v. TACA Int'l Airlines, S.A., 748 F.2d 965
(5th Cir. 1984) (holding that foreign relations consequences do not preclude court
from invoking Railway Labor Act to bar relocation of El Salvadoran airline to El
Salvador); Sage Int'l Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Mich. 1981)
(holding that foreign relations consequences do not preclude adjudication of anti-
trust action implicating the validity of orders of foreign government agents).
40. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Deciphering the Act of State Doctrine, 35 VILL. L.
REV. 1, 7 (1990). Disagreements about the foreign relations consequences of ad-
judication are not the only reason for the confusion. Another reason is uncer-
tainty in the application of the traditional rule. For example: What counts as an
act of state? Where is the situs of the act?
HeinOnline  -- 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1405 1999
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C. Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption
Prior to the 1960s, courts also used a rule-based, categori-
cal approach in assessing the validity of state acts not prohib-
ited by enacted federal law that nonetheless adversely affected
U.S. foreign relations. Such cases arose frequently.41 In these
cases courts asked only whether the state acts violated enacted
federal treaties and statutes, or were prohibited by constitu-
tional text. If they were not, the fact that they had profound
collateral effects on foreign relations was not viewed as a justi-
fication for federal judicial intervention. 42 This was true even
though during much of this period the Supreme Court exer-
cised dormant preemption powers in other contexts.43
Two decisions in the 1960s changed this understanding.
The first was Sabbatino. Before determining the content of the
act of state doctrine, the Sabbatino Court explained that the
doctrine, though not governed by a federal enactment, involved
a "uniquely federal" foreign relations issue that "must be
treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law."44 The Court
made clear that state power was excluded not because the
Constitution itself so required, but rather because the Court
decided that U.S. foreign relations interests so required. 45 The
Court determined both what the foreign relations interests of
41. See, e.g., DENNIS PALUMBO, THE STATES AND AMERICAN FOREIGN
RELATIONS (1960); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Fed-
eralism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1632-39 (1997).
42. See Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 1632-39; see also Henkin, supra note 5,
at 806.
43. See, e.g., Case of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872)
(dormant Commerce Clause); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 435
(1819) (power to tax federal instrumentalities); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 539, 622-25 (1842) (power to enact fugitive slave legislation); Chirac v. Les-
see of Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 269 (1817) (power to naturalize).
44. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 424-25 (1964); see
also id. at 427 ("[Plroblems surrounding the act of state doctrine
are ... intrinsically federal.").
45. See id. at 423-24. Congress overruled the decision in Sabbatino. See 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1994) (stating that the act of state doctrine shall not prevent
U.S. courts presented with "a claim of title or other rights to property" from in-
quiring into the validity of foreign expropriations of such property under interna-
tional law); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y.
1965), affd, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967) (upholding constitutionality of the stat-
ute).
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the United States were, and what those interests required in
terms of preemption of state law.46
The Court applied essentially the same logic four years
later in Zschernig v. Miller.47 That case involved an Oregon
statute that denied inheritance to an East German because
East Germany did not provide reciprocal rights to U.S. citi-
zens.48 The executive branch, as amicus curiae, stated that the
Oregon scheme did not adversely affect U.S. foreign relations. 49
But the Supreme Court disagreed. In striking down the Ore-
gon scheme, it determined that the statute had a "direct im-
pact upon foreign relations and may well adversely affect the
power of the central government to deal with those problems" 0
and concluded that the statute was an "intrusion by the state
into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts
to the President and the Congress."51 As in Sabbatino, the
Court performed an independent assessment of the foreign re-
lations requirements of the United States as a basis for pre-
emption of state law.
Since Zschernig and Sabbatino, federal courts have ap-
plied the foreign relations effects test as a basis for preemption
of state law in a variety of foreign relations contexts not gov-
erned by enacted federal law. They have preempted state law
in quasi-procedural contexts like the enforcement of forum se-
lection clauses and in more substantive private-law contexts
involving torts, contracts, and property.52 They have also in-
voked the foreign relations effects test to preempt state foreign
relations activities, such as "buy-American" statutes, interna-
46. See Henkin, supra note 5, at 815-16.
47. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
48. See id. at 430-31.
49. See id. at 434; see also id. at 460 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("The Depart-
ment of State has advised ... that state reciprocity laws, including that of Ore-
gon, have had as little effect on the foreign relations and policy of this country."
(quoting U.S. Memorandum at 5)); id. ("[Appellant's apprehension of deteriora-
tion in international relations [is] unsubstantiated by experience.").
50. Id. at 441; see also id. at 435 (holding that the statute's "great potential
for disruption or embarrassment makes us hesitate to place it in the category of a
diplomatic bagatelle"); id. at 441 ("State's policy may disturb foreign relations.").
51. Id. at 432.
52. See, e.g., Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 542-43
(5th Cir. 1997) (tort law); TAAG Linhas Aereas de Angola v. Transamerica Air-
lines, Inc., 915 F.2d 1351, 1353 (9th Cir. 1990) (forum selection clause); Grynberg
Prod. Corp. v. British Gas, P.L.C., 817 F. Supp. 1338, 1355-57 (E.D. Tex. 1993)
(contract law).
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tional tax schemes, and international sanctions. 53 The many
cases in which judges federalize an issue under a dormant for-
eign affairs rubric are matched by identical cases with seem-
ingly no less of a foreign relations quotient that do not involve
judicial preemption.54
D. Why the Foreign Relations Effects Test in the 1960s?
Baker, Sabbatino, and Zschernig were decided within a
six-year period in the 1960s. Each decision reflects the same
pattern. Each rejected a categorical, rule-like approach to the
accommodation of political branch prerogatives in foreign af-
fairs.5 1 And each embraced the identical foreign relations ef-
fects standard: abstention or preemption turned on a judicial
assessment of whether the adjudication or the state activities
adversely affected U.S. foreign relations or unduly impeded the
political branches' conduct of foreign relations.
This is not the place for a comprehensive historical analy-
sis of the reasons for this identical change in judicial approach
across such different judicial foreign relations doctrines in the
1960s. Several converging trends during this period permit
some preliminary speculations, however. Between the begin-
ning of the First World War and the end of the Second, the
United States had moved from a peripheral isolationist to one
of two world superpowers in a dangerous world marked by the
Cold War and the possibility of nuclear destruction. The op-
portunities and dangers of the modern world were thought by
just about everyone to require a much more centralized and
flexible foreign relations apparatus.5 6  Against this back-
53. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451
(1979) (state international tax scheme); National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker,
26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998) (state sanctions); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
Board of Comm'rs, 80 Cal. Rptr. 221 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (buy-American law).
54. For a few of many examples, see Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania,
916 F.2d 903, 905-06 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that Pennsylvania's buy-American
statute was not preempted); Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009,
1013-14 (E.D. Ark. 1973) (applying state law to find that reciprocity is not a con-
dition to giving conclusive effect to a foreign judgment in Arkansas).
55. With respect to the political question doctrine, it is more accurate to say
that the effects test supplements rather than replaces the traditional categorical
analysis, which courts still sometimes perform.
56. See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime
of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1 (1999), for the best account of the pre-
World War II period. For a continuation of the story after World War II, see Joel
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ground, the Supreme Court facilitated a dramatic change in
constitutional understanding that expanded executive foreign
relations power significantly and, more generally, centralized
foreign relations power in the federal government at the ex-
pense of the states. 57
The rise of the foreign relations effects test during the
Cold War makes sense against this background. The Court's
traditional rule-like approach to the judicial foreign relations
doctrines might have seemed unsatisfactory because any errors
of under- or overinclusiveness were thought to be unacceptably
costly in the Cold War world. The foreign relations effects test
might have seemed to allow the Court more flexibility in
avoiding costly foreign relations errors and in shaping its
judgments to the wishes of the Executive in crisis. 58 In addi-
tion, the effects test was consistent with both the larger move
in constitutional law from a category-based analysis to an in-
terest-balancing approach, 59 and with the Court's unprece-
dented confidence in its policymaking ability in the 1960s.
E. The Spread of the Foreign Relations Effects Test
The foreign relations effects test has been applied most ex-
tensively in the contexts in which it was born-the political
question and act of state doctrines, and dormant foreign affairs
preemption. But it has spread to many other contexts as well.
Whether a treaty is self-executing and thus a domestic source
of law sometimes depends on a judicial determination as to
whether the domestic application of the treaty would "have se-
rious foreign policy implications." 60  Courts have also consid-
ered foreign relations effects in judging the legal standing of
R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive
Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1998).
57. The leading cases are United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304 (1936); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920); United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
58. It is thus perhaps no accident that the first use of the foreign relations
effects test in a holding of the Court came in Sabbatino, a case involving a Cuban
expropriation of American property that was decided less than two years after
the Cuban Missile Crisis. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
398, 403 (1964).
59. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,
96 YALE L.J. 943, 949-52, 966-67 (1987).
60. Frolova v. USSR, 761 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir. 1985).
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foreign governments, 61 the reasonableness of agency action,62
the extraterritorial reach of federal law,63 the appropriateness
of habeas relief and discovery in extradition proceedings, 64 the
availability of federal question and pendent jurisdiction, 65 and
the extraterritorial enforcement of a grand jury subpoena.66
III. A CRITIQUE OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS EFFECTS TEST
Courts employ the foreign relations effects test to ensure
that the normal operation of our constitutional order-that
federal judges interpret federal enactments within their juris-
diction, and states are free to act in ways that do not violate
enacted federal law-does not create controversy unwanted by
the political branches. Several assumptions underlie judicial
use of the effects test. One is that the political branches need
assistance from federal courts in identifying and accommo-
dating U.S. foreign relations interests in federal law. Another
is that courts will do a good job of applying the foreign rela-
tions test in the minimal sense that the effects test contributes
to rather than detracts from a coherent U.S. foreign relations
law. A final assumption is that the effects test is a legitimate
judicial function. This section questions these assumptions.
A. The Questionable Need for Judicial Assistance
The political branches often delegate lawmaking functions
to federal courts. Sometimes they delegate these functions ex-
pressly, but more often they enact vague statutes that implic-
61. See National Coalition Gov't of Burma v. UNOCAL, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329,
339 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
62. See Pan Am World Airways v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 684 F.2d 31, 40
(D.C. Cir. 1982); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
63. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976); Greenpeace USA v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749 (D. Haw. 1990).
64. See Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340, 350 (4th Cir. 1983) (habeas);
In re Extradition of Singh, 123 F.R.D. 108, 115 (D.N.J. 1987) (discovery).
65. See Rendall-Speranza v. Nassim, 107 F.3d 913, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(pendent jurisdiction); PhIlipines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 352-53 (2d Cir. 1986)
(federal question jurisdiction); Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 62-63
(S.D. Tex. 1994) (same).
66. See United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384, 1391 (11th Cir.
1982).
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itly invite case-specific judicial lawmaking. 67 The foreign rela-
tions effects test, however, cannot realistically be viewed as a
response to gaps or vagueness in the federal scheme. Courts
applying the effects test do not take federal enactments as
their jumping-off point. Rather, these courts, with no hint of
political branch approval and with no consideration of extant
enactments, invoke their own conception of the foreign rela-
tions requirements of the United States to abstain from an
adjudication in which there is federal jurisdiction and substan-
tive federal law to apply, or to preempt state law in the ab-
sence of any suggestion that this is the desire of the political
branches. This practice is akin to a federal court abstaining
from adjudicating an enormous CERCLA suit based on a de-
termination that the adjudication would harm the domestic
economy, or preempting a state punitive damages regime on a
similar ground.
The standard explanation for why effects-based doctrines
of abstention and preemption are warranted in the foreign re-
lations context but not the CERCLA or punitive damages con-
texts is that more is at stake in the foreign relations context.
The belief here is that the consequences of an unwanted fed-
eral court adjudication or an unwanted state action are worse
(from some unarticulated normative perspective) in the foreign
relations than in the domestic context. This position is typi-
cally asserted rather than explained or defended. To the ex-
tent it makes any sense, it does so only with respect to
traditional "high" agenda foreign relations issues, such as war,
peace, and diplomacy. At the time of the Founding, as today,
these functions were considered essential aspects of sover-
eignty.68 Interference in these functions by federal courts and
states can plausibly be viewed to make it difficult for the fed-
eral political branches to participate effectively in interna-
tional relations. Not surprisingly, these are the very functions
that the traditional political question doctrine left to the dis-
cretion of the political branches and that the text of the Consti-
tution bars states from performing. 69 They are also functions
67. See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110
HARV. L. REV. 469 (1996).
68. See JERRILYN GREENE MARSTON, KING AND CONGRESS: THE TRANSFER
OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY, 1774-1776, at 206-23 (1987).
69. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Article I, section 10 does not expressly pro-
hibit the sending and receiving of ambassadors. But its prohibitions against
1999] 1411
HeinOnline  -- 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1411 1999
1412 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
that the political branches have comprehensively regulated,
thus alleviating the need for supplemental judicial judgments
about the proper role of federal courts and states.70
There are two reasons to question the need for supplemen-
tal judge-made doctrines of abstention or preemption outside of
these traditional "high" foreign relations contexts. First, to the
extent that the federal court or state acts in question collater-
ally touch on these traditional concerns, the adverse conse-
quences of these acts are not so significant as to warrant a
reversal of the usual assumptions of our constitutional order.
The foreign relations effects test was born at the height of the
Cold War, and its reversal of traditional constitutional as-
sumptions was justified, if at all, by the exigencies of the pe-
riod. It was plausible to think in 1964-less than two years
after the Cuban missile crisis-that the adjudication of a Cu-
ban expropriation of American property might produce a for-
eign relations crisis that literally threatened the nation's
existence.71 It is easy to understand a similar reaction to Ore-
gon's retaliatory legislation against East Germany in 1968.72
When formally analogous situations arise in our post-Cold
War world-for example, when a court adjudicates the validity
of a Russian act of state, or when Massachusetts sanctions
Myanmar for human rights violations-the consequences for
U.S. foreign relations and for the survival of the nation cannot
be compared to the Cold War period. They are from any per-
spective much less significant. Certainly they do not justify to
nearly the same degree the reversal of traditional constitu-
tional assumptions about judicial review and state autonomy
to act until preempted by the political branches.7 3
states entering into treaties or making compacts or waging war attenuates the
possibility that states will send and receive ambassadors in a manner that inter-
feres with federal diplomatic prerogatives. In any event, the federal political
branches through enacted law have ensured that the sending and receiving of
ambassadors is an exclusive federal prerogative.
70. See, e.g., Diplomatic Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 254 (1994); Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1994); Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261; Vienna Con-
vention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
71. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
72. See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
73. Peter Spiro makes a similar point in the federalism context in his con-
tribution to this symposium. See Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70
U. COLO. L. REV. 1223 (1999).
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The second reason to question the need for supplemental
judge-made doctrines of abstention or preemption is that the
effects test in fact rarely applies in contexts resembling tradi-
tional foreign relations concerns. The test is instead generally
applied to an expanded set of "new" foreign relations issues.
Increasing global interdependence and the dissolution of the
distinction between public and private international law mean
that almost any issue with a foreign element can now be
viewed to "affect" foreign affairs. The foreign affairs category
is further blurred by its expansion to include matters such as
crime, commerce, the environment, health and social issues,
human rights, private law matters, and much more.74 As the
categories of "foreign relations" and "foreign relations effects"
expand, the justification for a judicial foreign relations effects
test diminishes. The new foreign relations issues are not sig-
nificantly different from domestic issues. They have a foreign
element, to be sure, but they are not as central to the federal
government's conduct of foreign relations as the traditional
foreign relations functions. At the very least, courts exagger-
ate the extent to which foreign relations controversies in these
contexts implicate special concern.
Another reason to think that the federal political branches
do not need the special assistance provided by the judicial for-
eign relations effects test is that the likelihood of political
branch action is at its height when the nation is faced with a
genuine foreign relations threat. All things equal, we would
expect the likelihood of a targeted congressional response to
increase in step with the clarity and extent of a genuine for-
eign relations harm.7 5  And the executive branch-which is
primarily responsible for U.S. foreign relations, which moni-
tors these relations closely, and which is not burdened by col-
lective action problems to nearly the same degree as
Congress-has both inherent and delegated legislative powers
in the foreign relations field and unique abilities to influence
the judicial process and states through informal means.7 6
74. Many commentators have made these points. For my elaboration, see
Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 1670-80.
75. Reliance on expert political rather than inexpert judicial bodies to iden-
tify genuine foreign relations threats is also justified by the fact, analyzed below,
that it is ever more difficult to identify foreign relations harm.
76. See Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 1684-87; Harold Hongju Koh & John
Choon Yoo, Dollar Diplomacy/Dollar Defense: The Fabric of Economics and Na-
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Under the judicial foreign relations effects test, the likeli-
hood of judicial action (abstention or preemption) increases
with the threat of the foreign relations harm. But as this
threat increases, so too does the likelihood of political branch
action. As Julian Eule has noted in a different context, "There
is something fundamentally wrong with a judicial framework
that prompts judicial intervention by the same trigger that in-
duces political response. '77 This is especially true when the ju-
dicial framework seeks to protect political branch prerogatives
in foreign relations. By requiring special forms of judicial ac-
tion when we would most expect political action, the effects
test undermines this goal.
Of course, to say that the political branches have extraor-
dinary powers to respond to foreign relations harm is not to
say that they exercise perfect control in the sense of redressing
all unwanted foreign relations harms that result from the ex-
ercise of traditional federal court or state prerogatives. But
the lack of such control in domestic contexts does not justify a
domestic judicial effects test for abstention or preemption. The
claim that it does in the foreign relations context rests on the
just-questioned assumption that foreign relations are special
and that foreign relations controversies demand special rules
of avoidance. It also rests on the further assumption that fed-
eral courts can adequately, and at an acceptable cost, identify
and redress unwanted foreign relations harms in those cases
in which the federal political branches do not act. This as-
sumption is questioned in the next two parts.
B. Judicial Competence and the Effects Test
The foreign relations effects test requires federal courts to
identify and, through abstention or preemption, accommodate
U.S. foreign relations interests. This part questions whether
courts are well suited to perform this task. It is important to
first note, however, that courts applying the effects test rarely
take the test seriously. They do not consult pertinent foreign
relations enactments or attempt to assess the content of perti-
tional Security Law, 26 INT'L LAW. 715 (1992).
77. Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE
L.J. 425, 436 (1982) (footnote omitted); cf. JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND
RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 47-
67 (1993).
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nent U.S. foreign policy. Rather, they usually make a simple
intuitive judgment about the foreign relations consequences of
the adjudication. If the consequences seem sufficiently bad
from a usually unarticulated normative perspective, the courts
abstain or preempt, again usually without informed analysis of
how such a decision actually affects U.S. foreign relations.
This criticism suggests that courts do not engage in the
tasks necessary to legitimate the foreign relations effects test.
But could they, even in theory? Could federal courts, in the
absence of guidance from the political branches, accurately de-
termine when and how foreign relations interests require ab-
stention or preemption? Note that the problem is more severe
than the usual theoretical difficulties associated with judicial
attempts to divine congressional intent. For with the foreign
relations effects test, courts attempt to divine and accommo-
date U.S. foreign relations interests disembodied from any par-
ticular federal enactment.
The first difficulty comes in identifying the foreign rela-
tions interests of the United States. The identification and
proper accommodation of such interests is in fact an enor-
mously complex endeavor. Consider the complexities of the
controversy that arose when the State of Virginia convicted
Angel Breard, a Paraguayan citizen, of a capital crime after
failing to notify him of his Vienna Convention right to consult
a Paraguayan consul.78 Before Breard's execution, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice ("ICJ") issued a provisional order urging
the United States to take all feasible measures to stay Breard's
execution. The Supreme Court, at the urging of the executive
branch, declined to issue a stay.79 Setting aside for now the
difficult legal issues and domestic interests implicated by the
case,80 the failure to issue a stay seemed to many to be con-
trary to U.S. foreign policy interests.8 1 It angered Paraguay
and many others in the world community for the disrespect it
appeared to show to international law and the ICJ; and it por-
78. See Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998).
79. See id. at 1356.
80. For discussions of these issues, see the articles from the recent Breard
symposium published at Agora: Breard, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 666 (1998).
81. See Statement Amicus Curiae of International Law Professors at 9,
Breard v. Greene, 118 S. Ct. 1352 (1998) (No. 97-1390) (warning that failure to
stay execution might "cause incalculable and irreparable damage on the interna-
tional plane").
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tended retaliation against U.S. nationals abroad seeking pro-
tection under the Vienna Convention.
Nonetheless, it does not follow that the refusal to stay the
execution did not best serve U.S. foreign relations interests.
For if the United States had issued a stay in apparent obedi-
ence to the ICJ, it would almost certainly have angered key
congressional officials who are suspicious of international or-
ganizations and thus threatened much more important foreign
relations priorities, such as the payment of United Nations
dues and the establishment of the International Criminal
Court.82 The political branches clearly thought that this com-
bination of domestic political realities and foreign relations
priorities weighed in favor of going forward with the execution,
for both the Secretary of State and the Solicitor General urged
the Supreme Court not to issue a stay.83 But the decision was
open to serious question on policy grounds as being contrary to
U.S. foreign relations interests.
Breard exemplifies how difficult the identification and
proper accommodation of U.S. foreign relations interests can
be, even for experts. The difficulty is exacerbated by the wan-
ing of the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs, and
the related expansion of matters viewed to implicate foreign
relations controversy. In truth there is no definitive way of di-
vining the U.S. foreign relations interest in a particular context
or the manner in which this interest would be best accommo-
dated. The Constitution gives these tasks primarily to the po-
litical branches that have the expertise and structure to
perform them relatively well. The best we can hope for is that
an institution with relative expertise will be able to make such
decisions with finality.8 4
It is against this background that one must assess federal
court competence to determine whether the federal court adju-
dications or state acts adversely affect U.S. foreign relations or
82. Cf. Anne-Marie Slaughter, On a Foreign Death Row, WASH. POST, Apr.
14, 1998, at A15.
83. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Breard (No. 97-1390).
84. This is what our Constitution aims to do, although it is not always pre-
cise about the allocation among the political branches of final decision-making
authority in foreign affairs. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE
AND POWERS 1787-1957, at 171 (1957) (describing U.S. Constitution as "an invita-
tion [to the political branches] to struggle for the privilege of directing American
foreign policy").
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otherwise impede the political branches' conduct of foreign re-
lations. The always-difficult competence inquiry is exacer-
bated here by the fact that we lack an independent conception
of which adverse foreign relations effects the political branches
would want to eliminate. This means that we cannot measure
judicial outputs against an agreed-upon standard of correct-
ness. We must instead proceed by an indirect analysis, asking
whether the types of inquiries demanded by the effects test are
the types that the institution of federal courts are well suited
to answer.
The effects test is a quintessential standard. Terms like
"adversely affect," "impede," and "foreign relations interest"
obviously lack precise content. Courts have wide discretion to
determine the content of these terms at the moment of applica-
tion. A standard is supposed to gain accuracy at the price of
predictability by forcing the decision maker to make a
fine-grained contextual assessment of the values at issue. But
the success of the standard depends on the legal decision
maker's ability to make these judgments intelligently and ac-
curately.85  For well-known reasons summarized above,86
courts lack the tools to make accurate and intelligent judg-
ments in this context. Even without a clear notion of what ac-
curate and intelligent judgments look like in this context, there
is reason to think judges will often err in applying the effects
test to determine whether abstention or preemption is appro-
priate.87
Once one views the foreign relations effects test as a stan-
dard applied by incompetent decision makers, the apparent in-
coherence in the judicial foreign relations doctrines noted
above is unsurprising. Because federal courts lack the exper-
tise and the information to make such foreign relations judg-
ments, there is every reason to believe that the judgments
would often be erroneous. And because the standard calls for a
85. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953
(1995).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
87. I should emphasize here that I am not claiming that courts lack compe-
tence to interpret federal enactments related to foreign relations. Judicial com-
petence is at its height in interpreting enacted law, regardless of the content of
the law. My claim is, rather, that courts lack competence to identify, assess, and
accommodate U.S. foreign relation interests not embodied in a federal enactment.
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case-by-case inquiry into the foreign relations consequences of
adjudication, there is every reason to expect (as we know is the
case) that their decisions would be nonuniform. The fact that
the primary decision makers-lower federal courts-are
spread horizontally compounds the problem by, contrary to the
aims of the judicial foreign relations doctrines, fostering decen-
tralization of the foreign relations process. The Supreme
Court's certiorari practice ensures that this process remains
decentralized, further exacerbating the problem. Consistent
with these concerns, foreign sovereigns increasingly partici-
pate in the federal courts as amici, stating their interest in, or
offense at, the action in question.88 The expansion in the cate-
gory of acts perceived to "affect" U.S. foreign relations makes it
even harder for courts to identify, weigh, and accommodate
these interests accurately and coherently.
So the inconsistency and incoherence in the judicial for-
eign relations doctrines do not result from lack of principle. To
the contrary, they result from a principled application of the
effects test, which requires courts to make decisions that they
are unsuited to make and that invariably produce erroneous
and systematically inconsistent results. There is an irony
here. Many of the judicial foreign relations doctrines-espe-
cially the political question and act of state doctrines-are
premised on the fact that the courts lack competence to make
foreign relations judgments. The irony is that during the Cold
War, federal courts acting on this premise and attempting to
ensure political branch hegemony in foreign relations chose a
standard of analysis that required them to make the very
judgments they hoped to avoid.8 9
88. For recent examples, see Marathon Oil Co. v. Ruhrgas, A.G., 115 F.3d
315 (5th Cir. 1997); Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 530 (5th Cir.
1997).
89. There is a related point. The foreign relations literature treats the hori-
zontal deference and vertical preemption doctrines as distinct. The literature is
typically very critical of the horizontal deference doctrines, often on lack-of-
necessity and institutional competence arguments like the ones sketched above.
By contrast, the literature tends to be supportive of the vertical preemption doc-
trines, apparently blind to the fact that both the deference and preemption doc-
trines involve the same judicial analysis that implicates the same concerns. This
is not to say that the costs of the foreign relations effects test have the same sig-
nificance in both contexts. But those who criticize the horizontal deference doc-
trines and support the vertical preemption doctrines must recognize that similar
lack-of-necessity and institutional incompetence arguments apply prima facie in
both contexts.
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C. Possible Asymmetry in Political Branch Responses
The fact that federal courts are likely to do a bad job ap-
plying the effects test does not, by itself, undermine the test's
efficacy. The validity of the test ultimately depends on the ef-
ficacy of alternate arrangements. One might think that the ef-
fects test produces fewer problems than its absence would
produce. For example, one might think that the bad conse-
quences of plenary adjudication of all foreign relations cases is
worse than the bad consequences of an effects-based political
question or act of state doctrine. And even more plausibly, one
might think that the adverse foreign relations of state-by-state
regulation might be worse than less-than-ideal federal judicial
regulation.
These are complicated tradeoffs. Here I want to focus on
only one aspect of the complexity: the efficacy of political
branch responses to judicial errors. As discussed above, the
content of all the foreign relations doctrines discussed in this
essay is ultimately subject to political branch control.90 This
means that the political branches can in theory redress the er-
rors created by federal court adjudications and state activity,
as well as the errors that inhere in judicial attempts to redress
these problems via the effects test.
These errors, however, are not equally likely to induce a
political branch response. Scores of factors influence political
branch responsiveness, although there is little conceptual or
empirical analysis of this issue, especially in the foreign rela-
tions context.9 1 I want to focus here on political branch re-
sponsiveness to just one of many facets of judicial errors in the
application of the effects test: whether the error overprotects or
underprotects U.S. foreign relations interests. An overprotec-
tion error occurs when courts abstain or preempt on the basis
of a judicial foreign relations calculation, but the political
90. The statement in the text does not apply to the political question doc-
trine as traditionally practiced, which involved a constitutional judgment about
the allocation of foreign relations decision-making power to the political branches.
See supra pp. 1400-01.
91. The best general account is William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Su-
preme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991). For a
consideration of some of these issues in the foreign relations context, see James
Lindsay & Randall Ripley, Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress: A Research
Agenda for the 1990s, 17 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 417 (1992).
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branches would not have wanted abstention or preemption.
An underprotection error occurs when courts do not believe
that the foreign relations calculus requires abstention or pre-
emption, but the political branches would have wanted these
results. An underprotection error is functionally identical to
having no effects test whatsoever; it occurs when courts follow
their usual interpretive practices in a way that causes un-
wanted foreign relations controversy.
These two types of judicial errors in the application of the
judicial foreign relations doctrine seem likely to provoke
asymmetrical political branch responses. As I argued above,
the political branches are most likely to redress judicial under-
protection errors; political branch responsiveness is at its
height when a gap in federal law harms U.S. foreign relations
interests.92 This is probably not generally the case when fed-
eral courts overprotect U.S. foreign relations interests, because
judicial errors of this type do not typically have adverse affects
on U.S. foreign relations. To the extent this is true, the politi-
cal branches' special means of monitoring and control will not
be implicated, and the usual hurdles to congressional override
are more likely to be present.
Consider, as an example, how this analysis plays out in
the context of dormant foreign affairs preemption. The analy-
sis suggests that the political branches are more likely to in-
tervene when courts err in not preempting state law than
when courts err in preempting state law, for the latter case is
less likely to create foreign relations controversy, and thus less
likely to provoke a political branch response. Of course, there
are many other factors at work, even in this context, that
might affect political branch responsiveness. For example,
when courts err in preempting state law, the states as an in-
terest group have unusual power to influence a congressional
response. That said, states still face the burden of inertia, and
in our modern interdependent global society federal lawmakers
have independent incentives to federalize and internationalize
previously local issues that implicate international affairs. 93
92. Professor Henkin's 35-year-old assessment has even greater force today:
"The foreign relations of the United States do not cry for the courts to fill an obvi-
ous lack of law left for them by the Constitution or by necessary implication from
the words or the silences of the political branches." See Henkin, supra note 5, at
817-18.
93. See Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future in the Global Village, 47
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These complicating factors make clear that the analysis of ju-
dicial error along the dimension of over- and underprotection of
U.S. foreign relations interests is not comprehensive. It
merely suggests a tendency in the likelihood of congressional
response.
D. Legitimacy Concerns
I have thus far focused on what might be thought of as the
functional difficulties with the foreign relations effects test. I
have suggested that in the hands of federal courts, the foreign
relations effects test does not contribute to coherent federal
foreign relations law and does not well serve the aim of pro-
tecting political branch prerogatives in foreign relations. Each
step of the argument has rested on plausible but certainly-not-
proven quasi-empirical claims. And in any event such func-
tional arguments, even if convincing, would not explain all of
what is wrong with the judicial foreign relations effects test.
For example, most of the problems outlined above would re-
main even if Congress expressly authorized the foreign rela-
tions effects test. Relatedly, if Article III commanded the
foreign relations effects test, functional arguments against its
validity would have less weight.
These examples show that a functional analysis of the ef-
fects test must be bolstered by an analysis of its legitimacy
from a more traditional constitutional perspective. This analy-
sis faces the objection that structural constitutional limits ap-
ply with less rigor in the foreign relations context.94 This is not
a view that I accept, although I lack space to explain why here.
I will instead simply assume that structural constitutional
limits apply to federal courts even in the foreign relations con-
text.
Consider first the legitimacy of the horizontal abstention
doctrines such as act of state and political question. Here ab-
stention masks the exercise of extraordinary judicial power, for
courts on which Congress has conferred jurisdiction are decid-
VAND. L. REV. 1441, 1473-78 (1994).
94. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936);
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432-35 (1919); LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 211 (2d ed. 1988) ("[Tlhe Constitution's separation of pow-
ers and its arrangement of checks and balances are less precise in [the area of
foreign affairs] than a survey of the text might suggest.").
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ing which cases to adjudicate on the basis of their own analy-
ses of U.S. foreign relations. 95 To see the problem, consider the
relationship between the executive branch and the federal
courts implicated by the effects test. One might conclude from
the Executive's constitutional responsibility to conduct U.S.
foreign relations and its superior competence to do so that
courts should defer to the Executive's formal or informal repre-
sentation about the best outcome in a case. 96 But with respect
to the foreign relations effects test, courts are careful not to de-
fer to the Executive's analysis of U.S. foreign relations.97 Why?
One answer is that the Executive has no authority to make law
on a case-by-case basis. This answer is not wholly adequate,
for courts have no more apparent authority-indeed, from any
perspective they have less. Another answer is that courts do
not want to be "a mere errand boy for the Executive Branch
which may choose to pick some people's chestnuts from the
fire, but not others."98 This response also points to the law-
lessness of the effects test as applied by both the Executive and
federal courts.
The point is that judges applying the effects test in the po-
litical question and act of state doctrine contexts are doing pre-
cisely what everyone thinks is illegitimate when done by the
executive branch, which has more competence and arguably
more constitutional authority because of its unique role in for-
eign relations. What courts are doing is illegitimate because it
is not grounded in an authoritative source of law. To be.sure,
courts and scholars invoke "structural" constitutional consid-
erations in support of an effects-based political question and
act of state doctrine. But such structural arguments are really
nothing more than a mask for the effects test itself, since the
"structural" need for the effects test is itself based on a judicial
95. See FRANCK, supra note 28; ELY, supra note 77.
96. Courts do in fact almost always agree with the Executive's views about
outcomes in foreign relations cases, although they do not always embrace the Ex-
ecutive's suggested legal arguments.
97. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759
(1972) (majority of Justices reject the view that Court must defer to Executive
suggestion regarding application of act of state doctrine); Zschernig v. Miller, 389
U.S. 429 (1968) (disagreeing with the government's foreign policy calculus); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428, 431-32, 437 (1964) (emphasiz-
ing that act of state doctrine does not depend on foreign relations assessment of
the Executive).
98. First Nat'l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 773 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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assessment of U.S. foreign relations interests. This bootstrap
argument for the effects test is no more legitimate-and in-
deed, is almost certainly less so-than an effects-based discre-
tionary foreign relations lawmaking power in the Executive.
A similar analysis applies to dormant foreign affairs pre-
emption. In this context, it seems like structural constitu-
tional arguments have greater force because of the widespread
belief that the Constitution's structure makes foreign affairs
an exclusive federal concern. But there is little constitutional
justification for this view. If anything, Article I, section 10's
express checks on state power in select foreign relations con-
texts suggest that in other areas there is no self-executing
realm of exclusive federal foreign relations power. 99 And in-
deed this was the settled practice for the first 175 years of our
nation's history until matters changed with the adoption of the
effects test in Sabbatino and Zschernig.100
At bottom, the ostensible structural constitutional argu-
ment for dormant foreign affairs preemption is, once again, lit-
tle more than the effects test in action. Courts infer the need
for an effects-based federal exclusivity based on naked judicial
determinations about the needs of U.S. foreign relations. This
bootstrap argument provides no independent constitutional
justification for an effects-based judicial preemption in the for-
eign relations context. The "structural" preemption argument
is especially illegitimate when applied to issues that, despite
the foreign affairs patina, involve traditional state prerogatives
such as criminal law, private law, health and social issues, and
the like. 10 These issues are not exclusive federal concerns.
Standard tenets of American federalism suggest that the deci-
sion to regulate such issues by federal law must be made by
the national political branches where state interests are repre-
sented, and not by federal courts.10 2
An additional problem with such preemption is that it ig-
nores pertinent separation of powers objections. Recall that
courts applying the effects test make federal law in an area
that is a central prerogative of the federal political branches
99. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
100. See Goldsmith, supra note 41, at 1641-64.
101. See supra p. 1413.
102. See Thomas Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 17 (1985); see also Friedman, supra note 93, at 1473-78 (making
related point in treaty context).
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without any apparent authorization from those branches. This
form of "prerogative" federal common law intrudes on political
branch prerogatives by circumventing the various constitu-
tional hurdles to the making of federal foreign relations law,
thereby lowering the costs of federal lawmaking and dimin-
ishing the goals promoted by such costs. 103 One cannot ignore
these separation of powers objections by reference to the sup-
posed federal exclusivity in foreign affairs, for by hypothesis
both intrude on political branch prerogatives.
In sum, the assumptions that underlie the foreign rela-
tions effects test are all open to question. The political
branches have unique incentives and means to calibrate U.S.
federal foreign relations law, and thus have relatively little
need for an extra layer of judicial assistance. Judges are in
any event not well suited to provide such assistance, at least
not via the foreign relations effects test, especially in the post-
Cold War world where the category of foreign relations has ex-
panded dramatically and no longer implicates the same con-
cerns. In addition, all things equal, an asymmetry in likely
political branch response to judicial errors in applying the ef-
fects test cuts against the test's application. Finally, the ef-
fects test contemplates a role for the federal judiciary that
exceeds the usual limitations on federal common lawmaking.
IV. THE NEW FORMALISM IN UNITED STATES FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW
Since the end of the Cold War, the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts have begun to adopt a more formalistic
approach to the judicial foreign relations doctrines under con-
sideration here. The Court's decisions embrace-sometimes
explicitly, sometimes implicitly-many of the criticisms of the
foreign relations effects test sketched above. They all reject
the foreign relations effects test and replace it with an ap-
proach that narrows judicial discretion by specifying the con-
tent of federal law prior to the point of judicial decision. This
103. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative, 12 PACE L. REV. 327,
349-50 (1992).
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section describes the new formalism and sketches a framework
for its analysis.
A. The New Formalism
1. Act of State Doctrine
Recall that Sabbatino made the act of state doctrine's ap-
plicability turn on a judicial assessment of the foreign relations
implications of examining the validity of foreign acts of state,
and that act of state jurisprudence during the quarter century
following Sabbatino was viewed as confused and inconsistent.
In W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics
Corp.,104 the Supreme Court significantly curtailed the rele-
vance of inquiries into the foreign relations implications of ju-
dicial decisions, and instead embraced a rule-like approach. At
issue in Kirkpatrick was whether the act of state doctrine
barred the adjudication of a suit between Americans that in-
volved bribes to Nigerian officials. 10 5 Both lower courts had
engaged in fine-grained inquiries into the foreign relations
consequences of the adjudication, and had reached different
conclusions. 10 6 In the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General ar-
gued for a similar case-by-case analysis. 1'07
The Court expressly rejected this effects-test approach to
the doctrine's applicability. It acknowledged that "the policies
underlying our act of state cases-international comity, re-
spect for the sovereignty of foreign nations on their own terri-
tory, and the avoidance of embarrassment to the Executive
Branch in its conduct of foreign relations"-are implicated by
the case.'08 But it rejected the view that "those underlying
policies are a doctrine unto themselves.' 0 9 The Court held
that these fine-grained policy judgments were relevant, if at
all, only in the exceptional case where the validity of the act of
state was at issue.1'0 This approach significantly narrows the
scope of judicial foreign relations inquiries in the act of state
104. 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
105. See id. at 401-04.
106. See id. at 403-04.
107. See id. at 408.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 409.
110. See id. at 405, 409.
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context by establishing a scope-limiting, rule-like preliminary
inquiry-is the validity of an act of state in issue?-as a pre-
requisite to even theoretical consideration of foreign relations
effects.
2. Dormant Foreign Affairs Preemption
A similar move from a case-by-case effects test to a more
rule-like approach has taken place in the dormant foreign af-
fairs preemption context. Beginning in the 1960s, opponents of
California's "worldwide combined reporting" tax for multina-
tional corporations had tried, unsuccessfully, to convince the
federal political branches to preempt the tax.'1 ' Their failure
in the political process prompted suit in the case of Barclays
Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board.112 The essential issue in
the case was whether the California tax should be invalidated
under a dormant foreign affairs preemption rationale. The
plaintiffs claimed that the statute "impair[ed] federal uni-
formity in an area where federal uniformity is essential""3 by
preventing "the Federal Government from 'speaking with one
voice' in international trade."1" 4 In support of this claim, they
relied heavily on Zschernig, the enormous diplomatic contro-
versy provoked by the California scheme, and amicus filings
from foreign nations alleging offense at the California law.
The Court rejected this legal challenge and, with it, the
foreign relations effects test. It made clear that courts had no
authority to identify foreign relations effects and weigh them
against the competing legitimate interests of states. 15 And it
emphasized that it was the job of "Congress-whose voice, in
this area, is the Nation's-to evaluate whether the national in-
terest is best served by tax uniformity, or state autonomy. 116
What mattered for the Court was whether a federal law validly
enacted by one of the political branches had preempted the
111. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 302 (1994).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 320 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S.
434, 448 (1979)).
114. Id. (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)).
115. See id. at 328 ("The judiciary is not vested with power to decide 'how to
balance a particular risk of retaliation against the sovereign right of the United
States as a whole to let the States tax as they please."' (quoting Container Corp.
of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983))).
116. Id. at 331 (emphasis added).
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state action; foreign relations effects were not an independent
basis for preemption. 117 And the Court went on to establish a
presumption that congressional inaction in the face of adverse
state foreign relations activity indicates "Congress' willingness
to tolerate" the state practice."18
Barclay's Bank marks a return to a pre-Sabbatino, pre-
Zschernig approach to state activities that cause foreign rela-
tions controversy. This regime is rule-like for courts because it
rejects a foreign relations effects standard and directs courts to
apply state law that adversely affects U.S. foreign relations
unless preemption can be traced to a political branch's enact-
ment. Of course whether the political branches have pre-
empted state law in any particular case is not always a
determinant inquiry. But it is much more determinant, and
involves much less judicial discretion, than a regime that per-
mits preemption under both enacted-law and foreign-relations-
effects rationales.
3. Political Question Doctrine
A similar though less distinct move away from the effects
test has occurred in the political question context. In Japan
Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society, 1 9 the Supreme
Court held that the political question doctrine did not preclude
it from reviewing the Executive's decision not to sanction Ja-
pan for noncompliance with a whaling treaty. Consistent with
the new formalism, the Court acknowledged that it lacked
competence or authority to make naked foreign policy judg-
ments. 20 Also consistent with the new formalism, it rejected
the view that it should abstain from interpreting treaties and
117. See id. at 328-30.
118. Id. at 327; see also id. at 326 ("Congress implicitly has permitted the
States to use the worldwide combined reporting method."); id. at 331 (Blackmun,
J., concurring) (stating that majority opinion relies on "congressional inaction to
conclude 'that Congress implicitly has permitted the States to use the worldwide
combined reporting method'"). The Court did not specify whether this inference
is limited to cases, like Barclays Bank, in which Congress had expressly consid-
ered and rejected federalization of the state activity in question.
119. 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
120. See id. at 230 (noting that the "Wjudiciary is particularly ill suited to
make [foreign policy decisions because] courts are fundamentally underequipped
to formulate national policies or develop standards for matters not legal in na-
ture" (citations omitted)).
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executive agreements because of foreign relations effects. 121
It is unclear whether Japan Whaling represents a broad
retreat from an effects-based political question doctrine. Sev-
eral lower federal courts have invoked the decision as a basis
for rejecting the political question doctrine on the basis of the
adverse foreign relations consequences of an adjudication. 122
To the extent these decisions represent a trend, it is one that
narrows judicial discretion by directing courts to apply federal
law without recourse to a safety valve of abstention based on a
judicial determination of foreign relations effects. The federal
enactments themselves of course might be couched in terms of
standards rather than rules, and their interpretation thus
might not be determinate. But the additional level of discre-
tion and thus indeterminacy provided by the effects test is
eliminated.
4. Extraterritoriality
Another recent example of a shift to formalism can be
found in the Supreme Court's decision in EEOC v. Arabian
American Oil Co. ,121 which considered the extraterritorial
scope of Title VII. Most federal statutes do not specify whether
or not they apply abroad. As a policy matter, the appropriate
extraterritorial scope of a statute depends on a complex bal-
ance of domestic and foreign relations concerns, including the
domestic goals served by the statute and the possibility of of-
fending a foreign sovereign by applying American notions of
regulation to activities that take place abroad. In addition,
even if a statute should apply abroad to some extent, difficult
questions remain as to the circumstances of its extraterritorial
application. For example, should Title VII require a U.S. em-
ployer in Saudi Arabia to hire someone in violation of local re-
ligious restrictions? Rather than making these and numerous
121. See id. at 230 (invoking Baker v. Carr's dictum that it is "error to sup-
pose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond
judicial cognizance" and concluding that "under the Constitution, one of the Judi-
ciary's characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this re-
sponsibility merely because our decision may have significant political overtones"
(citation and internal quotation omitted)).
122. See, e.g., Earth Island Inst. v. Christopher, 6 F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 1993);
Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1991); Chiles v. Thornborough, 865 F.2d
1197 (11th Cir. 1989).
123. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
1428 [Vol. 70
HeinOnline  -- 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1428 1999
THE NEW FORMALISM
other judgments on a case-by-case basis, as the Supreme Court
and especially the lower courts had done in earlier cases,2 the
Arabian American Oil Co. Court embraced a broader rule-like
presumption that federal statutes do not apply extraterritori-
ally unless Congress plainly states otherwise in the statute.
125
5. Self-Executing Treaties
In recent years courts attempting to determine whether a
treaty is self-executing have begun to eschew a multi-factored
approach that includes the effects test as a central component.
They have instead opted for a more rule-like approach, akin to
the presumption against extraterritoriality, that presumes
that a treaty is non-self-executing.126
B. The Promise and Uncertainty of the New Formalism
The new formalism can be viewed as a judicial response to
the many problems with the foreign relations effects standard.
The move from rules to standards to rules clearly reduces judi-
cial decision costs associated with the prior regime.127 Whether
it reduces the error costs-in other words, whether it better
serves the purposes of the judicial foreign relations doctrines
previously serviced by the foreign relations effects test--de-
pends on several factors. It depends on the purposes of the
doctrines. And it depends on the content of the new rules, the
validity of which depends on the quality of the judgments-
sometimes conceptual, often empirical-that support them.
There are. two related problems here. First, not just any
rule will do. A directive that requires courts to apply the po-
litical question doctrine only in cases filed on Tuesday would
shrink decision costs but would not well serve the goal of pro-
124. See generally Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial
Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1 (1992).
125. See 499 U.S. at 248.
126. For decisions suggestive of this trend, see Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v.
United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir. 1992); More v. Intelcom Support
Servs., Inc., 960 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp.
791 (S.D. Fla. 1992). See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Con-
stitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 541 (1999)
(discussing trend toward a non-self-executing treaty presumption).
127. But of course it increases the decision costs on political actors, a point
discussed infra Part IV.B.2.
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tecting political branch prerogatives in foreign relations. A
related difficulty is that the presumptive rule crafter, the Su-
preme Court, might be relatively incompetent to craft intelli-
gent rules for the same reasons it is unsuited to apply the
foreign relations effects standard. Since there are other factors
that point toward a rule-based approach, this need not be the
death-knell for a rule-based approach. It depends on whether
less-than-perfect rules designed by the Supreme Court better
serve the underlying goals than the current standard-like re-
gime. Even if the Supreme Court is relatively inexpert in iden-
tifying and accommodating U.S. foreign relations interests, it
might be relatively well suited to make broader judgments that
enable it to better serve the goals of the judicial foreign rela-
tions doctrines.
With these caveats in mind, this section aims to sketch a
framework for analyzing whether a new rule-based approach
might better serve the purposes of the judicial foreign relations
doctrines than the foreign relations effects standard.
1. The Functional Case
The functional strengths and weaknesses of the new for-
malism can profitably be analyzed by analogy to the literature
on default rules in contracts. 128 The term "rule" suggests a di-
rective that narrows judicial discretion by specifying the direc-
tive's content prior to application; the term "default" suggests
that the directive is subject to revision by certain parties. In
the contracts literature, default rules are the background rules
that govern contractual relations in the absence of a different
specification by the contracting parties. 12 9 Like default rules
for contracts, the judicial foreign relations doctrines are de-
signed to help judges give content to political branch wishes in
the face of political branch unclarity, unless and until the po-
litical branches specify otherwise. Although default rules can
128. See Elizabeth Garrett, Legal Scholarship in an Age of Legislation, 34
TULSA L.J. (forthcoming 1999); Cass Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Em-
pirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 1999); Adrian Vermeule, Interpreta-
tion, Empiricism, and the Closure Problem, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming
1999).
129. For an overview, see Richard Craswell, Contract Law: General Theo-
ries, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (forthcoming).
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take many forms, 130 I shall focus on two: majoritarian defaults
and information-forcing defaults.
If a judicial foreign relations doctrine takes the form of a
majoritarian default, it aims to mimic what the political
branches would have done had they addressed the issue.13'
Notice that in some sense this is the same aim of the foreign
relations effects standard. But a rule-like approach eschews a
fine-grained case-by-case analysis. In the face of uncertainty
about the scope of federal foreign relations law, it seeks in-
stead to make wider, and hopefully more informed, predictions
about the aims of the political branches. Such broader rules
are bound to be over- and underinclusive with respect to the
purposes of the foreign relations doctrines. The hope is that on
balance they will do a better job of tracking these purposes
than a case-by-case approach.
The new formalism decisions might be justified on ma-
joritarian default grounds. For example, rejection of an effects-
based political question doctrine appears to accord with con-
gressional wishes in conferring jurisdiction on courts to adjudi-
cate cases involving treaties and foreign relations statutes.
Similarly, the judicial refusal to preempt state law because of
foreign relations effects arguably tracks political branch
wishes more closely than does preemption, for political branch
inaction is meaningful in light of the political branches' special
means and incentives to preempt offending state law in the
foreign relations context. This is especially true in those con-
texts, such as Barclay's Bank, where the offending state activ-
ity has been thoroughly examined by Congress.
The Supreme Court has invoked the majoritarian default
rationale most explicitly in the context of the presumption
against extraterritoriality. As noted above, the decision
whether and to what extent to apply an otherwise-silent fed-
130. See id.
131. By phrasing the inquiry in this way, I hope to side-step the well-known
difficulties with any attempt to discern the "intent" of the legislature. In applying
a majoritarian default in the context of the judicial foreign relations doctrines,
federal courts are not attempting to divine the intent of Congress. Because these
doctrines have no basis in enacted federal law, there is nothing from which to di-
vine such intent, even assuming the notion made sense. Courts instead estimate
how the political branches would resolve a particular issue had they addressed it.
This analysis is far from determinate, but, as I suggest below, it is not indetermi-
nate either, and it attenuates the conceptual pitfalls of determining congressional
intent.
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eral statute abroad involves difficult policy choices. The Court
has justified its use of a rule-like presumption against extra-
territoriality rather than a case-by-case inquiry on the basis of
its judgment that "Congress generally legislates with domestic
concerns in mind."1 32 The Court thus recognizes that the pre-
sumption will sometimes result in error, at least from the per-
spective of capturing general congressional wishes. But the
Court presumably thinks this class of errors is less trouble-
some than the potential costs of a case-by-case judicial ap-
proach, which include: (1) errors that inhere in a direct judicial
analysis of whether and how particular statutes should be con-
strued to apply extraterritorially; (2) high judicial decision
costs of such an approach; and (3) costs of uncertainty-to po-
litical actors and affected individuals-that inhere in this ap-
proach.
The presumption against extraterritoriality reveals the
virtues and vices of a majoritarian default-rule approach. On
the virtue side of the ledger are the usual benefits of rules-
namely, ease of application, reduction of judicial discretion
(and a related reduction in the decentralization of federal
foreign relations lawmaking), increase in predictability, and
attenuation of inconsistency. To understand the vice side of
the ledger, one need only recognize that these virtues would be
realized by any rule, including a presumption in favor of
extraterritoriality. This shows that a majoritarian default
depends heavily on the accuracy of the Court's judgment about
the general wishes of the political branches (not to mention the
coherence of the idea of such general wishes). In the face of
uncertainty, the Court needs to be able to make such general
judgments in order to avoid the many problems of a fine-
grained case-by-case assessment.
The hope of the majoritarian default approach is that
courts are in a better position to make a relatively accurate
judgment about Congress's general aims even when they can-
not make accurate, context-specific ones. This is not an im-
plausible claim. Consider the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Courts are ill-prepared to determine
132. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993) (emphasis added);
see also Foley Bros: v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (stating that presumption
against extraterritoriality is a "valid approach whereby unexpressed congres-
sional intent may be ascertained" (emphasis added)).
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whether and to what extent particular statutes should apply
abroad; but they encounter the full range of federal statutes,
and thus are relatively well positioned to answer the question
whether Congress usually legislates with domestic issues in
mind or with extraterritorial issues in mind. Ultimately, of
course, this issue is a largely empirical one laced with concep-
tual questions about the coherence of predicting what the po-
litical branches would have done. The modest point here is
that courts are likely better suited to answer this general
question than the more fine-grained ones required by the ef-
fects test.
A majoritarian default rule works best when courts have
confidence in the accuracy of their general judgment about how
Congress would have addressed the issue.133 If a court lacks
confidence in its ability to make this determination, it should
perhaps instead design default rules that encourage the politi-
cal branches to specify their wishes. 34 This is the aim of an in-
formation-forcing default rule. In contract theory, an
information-forcing default rule is one that burdens the party
who is theoretically best positioned to clarify a contractual is-
sue in the hope of creating an incentive for that party to ad-
dress the issue in the contract. 35 In the context of the judicial
foreign relations doctrines, an information-forcing default rule
encourages the political branches to make their intentions
clear about the content of the federal foreign relations law in
question. It tries to give the political branches incentives to
clarify the content of federal law. It does this by self-
consciously acting contrary to congressional intent in the hopes
of spurring an accurate congressional response.
At first glance, the foreign relations context seems like an
ideal one in which to apply information-forcing default rules.
Judges are relatively incompetent in this context to determine
the appropriate content of federal law, so perhaps they should
act to urge the officials with superior competence-the political
branches-to do so. For example, we might justify the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality as the rule best designed
to encourage the political branches to decide whether and to
what extent federal statutes apply abroad. Arabian American
133. See Sunstein, supra note 128 (manuscript at 11-13).
134. See id.
135. See Craswell, supra note 129.
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Oil Co. might be viewed to support this view. 136 For the Court
in that case noted that if its general presumption as applied to
Title VII were wrong, Congress could "calibrate [Title VII's]
provisions in a way that we cannot."137 And this is exactly
what Congress did. It amended Title VII the next year to
specify the complex circumstances in which the statute would
apply abroad-circumstances that essentially split the differ-
ence between a purely domestic application and a full-throttled
extraterritoriality. 38 Professor Curtis Bradley concludes from
these events that "[t]he presumption thus appears to have had
the effect of forcing Congress to focus specifically on the politi-
cal problems and uncertainties raised by extraterritoriality." 39
This conclusion at first glance seems plausible, but a
closer analysis of the Arabian American Oil Co. overruling re-
veals the difficulty with information-forcing strategies. The
essential problem is that information-forcing rules only work if
there is independent reason to think that the rule actually re-
veals information. This is less likely to be the case in the sepa-
ration of powers context than in the contracts context because
Congress faces significantly greater collective action and iner-
tia hurdles to rational action in the face of an information-
forcing default than do individuals and firms. Congress is
usually silent in response to judicial invocation of the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality.140 Without much more in-
formation about when and why congressional silence is
meaningful, courts cannot know whether silence by itself rep-
resents legislative inertia or legislative agreement with the
presumption. 41
Moreover, there is little reason to think that Congress will
systematically respond to errors in application of the presump-
tion against extraterritoriality. This is because error in this
context-interpreting U.S. law to apply domestically when
Congress would prefer extraterritorial application-is not an
136. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
137. Id.
138. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994)).
139. Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of
Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 553 (1997) (emphasis added).
140. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993); Smith v.
United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993).
141. Nor, of course, does this silence necessarily mean that the presumption
reflects general congressional intent.
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overprotection error (in other words, it does not provoke for-
eign relations controversy) and thus, all things equal, is not
likely to provoke a congressional response. Arabian American
Oil Co. is not necessarily a counterexample, for it was over-
ruled as part of a package of amendments to Title VII that
overruled a series of higher-profile and more controversial Su-
preme Court Title VII rulings.
There are other difficulties with information-forcing
strategies. If the Court were seeking a true information-
forcing default rule in the extraterritoriality context, it should
have established one contrary to the majoritarian rule-per-
haps a presumption in favor of violating international law.
Such a presumption would likely run against congressional
wishes and provoke angry responses from foreign nations; in
this way it would better encourage Congress to specify ex ante
whether a statute violates international law, or to give a
meaningful response ex post.142 This points to an additional
constraint on courts' ability to play the information-forcing
game. Unless they are perfectly confident that the default will
induce congressional action, they might end up with the worst
of both worlds: a federal rule that goes against congressional
wishes but that Congress will not override. And even if they
did have perfect confidence in the default's efficacy, crafting
rules contrary to Congress's wishes is a heavy-handed and
probably illegitimate judicial function. This is perhaps why
courts never engage in pure information-forcing strategies.
I do not mean to suggest that an information-forcing de-
fault regime has no place in the foreign relations context. For
sometimes a majoritarian default will have information-forcing
qualities as well. This is likely to happen when a majoritarian
default rule systematically leads to underprotective errors.
Recall that underprotection errors produce foreign relations
controversy unwanted by the political branches. For reasons
outlined above, these situations are ones in which we would
expect political branch intervention to be most likely. A rela-
tively accurate majoritarian default rule that produces errors
that are systematically information-forcing is the best combi-
142. In this respect, it is not even clear that rules do a better job of pro-
moting congressional response than standards. It might be that the randomness
that inheres in incompetent judicial applications of standards will most likely
provoke a congressional response.
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nation of majoritarian and information-forcing regimes. For it
reduces judicial decision and error costs, and the errors that
are committed are-all else equal-systematically likely to be
redressed by the political branches.
With the exception of the presumption against extraterri-
toriality, the new formalism decisions can be viewed as majori-
tarian defaults that produce errors, if at all, with information-
forcing qualities. That is, errors in their application are most
likely to produce unwanted foreign relations controversy. Con-
sider Barclay's Bank, which rejected the effects test in the
dormant preemption context. By offering no judicial protection
for state acts that produce unwanted foreign relations harm,
this regime's errors will all produce unwanted foreign relations
controversy of the type most likely to induce a political branch
response. The same is true of Kirkpatrick's "validity" prereq-
uisite, which again narrowed the scope of judicial protection
and is thus likely to lead to errors, if at all, in the direction of
underprotection. Finally, a presumption against a treaty's
self-execution is also likely to produce underprotection errors.
This is because foreign countries are much more likely to com-
plain about the nonenforcement of a treaty norm in the U.S.
domestic system than its enforcement.
2. The Legitimacy Case
In both the federalism and separation of powers contexts,
the Supreme Court's rejection of the effects test and its em-
brace of the new formalism appear to be driven by the concerns
about the legitimate scope of judicial power outlined above. 43
For example, the Barclay's Bank Court noted that the peti-
tioner's complaints about the adverse foreign relations conse-
quences of the California tax were "directed to the wrong
forum" because "[t]he judiciary is not vested with power to de-
cide 'how to balance a particular risk of retaliation against the
sovereign right of the United States as a whole to let the
States tax as they please."1144 The Kirkpatrick Court's act of
state decision emphasized that "[c]ourts in the United States
143. See supra Part III.B.
144. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 328 (1994)
(quoting Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983))
(emphasis added).
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have the power, and ordinarily the obligation, to decide cases
and controversies properly presented to them,"'45 and that the
act of state was "not some vague doctrine of abstention."1 46 Fi-
nally, the Arabian American Oil Co. Court's presumption
against extraterritoriality was premised on the inappropriate-
ness of federal courts making the foreign policy judgments that
inhere in the determination of extraterritoriality.141
The new formalism appears more consistent with our tra-
ditional understanding of the role of the judiciary than the for-
eign relations effects test. Courts have a long tradition of
crafting general interpretive rules based on their assessment
of the general wishes of the political branches and on general
considerations about the proper function of courts and the
proper incentives courts should give Congress to carry out its
constitutional duties. 148 At bottom, the new formalism aims to
minimize unauthorized judicial foreign policy judgments and to
tie the judicial foreign relations doctrines more closely to the
aims of the political branches as embodied in enacted federal
law. It also eliminates the paradoxical relationship that ex-
isted under the effects test between federal courts and the Ex-
ecutive. The Executive still retains significant authority to
influence the content of federal foreign relations law through
the same means it does in purely domestic contexts by making
legal arguments about the content of federal law to which
courts give great weight. Finally, to the extent that a regime
of contracted judicial activity imposes additional decision costs
on political actors in the foreign relations context, these are
precisely the types of costs that they should absorb under the
Constitution. '49
CONCLUSION
The Cold War foreign relations effects test had the osten-
sible purpose of protecting political branch prerogatives in for-
145. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S.
400, 409 (1990).
146. Id. at 406.
147. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 250-51 (1991); see also
Bradley, supra note 126 (elaboration of this reading of the decision).
148. For an overview, see Cass Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regu-
latory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989).
149. Cf. ELY, supra note 77.
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eign relations. In fact it produced the opposite effect. By giv-
ing federal courts the discretionary power to affect the content
of federal foreign relations law on the basis of an independent
judicial assessment of the requirements of U.S. foreign rela-
tions, the test set up federal courts as an independent federal
lawmaking competitor to the federal political branches. This is
ironic because the test required federal courts to do precisely
what they consistently disclaimed competence or authority to
do-namely, make foreign policy judgments. The test exceeded
the legitimate lawmaking powers of federal courts and de-
tracted from the coherence of federal foreign relations law.
The new formalism is a response to these problems. Viewed in
its best light, it seeks to capture the political branches' general
wishes about the scope of federal foreign relations law in ways
that minimize judicial foreign policy judgments and induce the
political branches to fine tune the scope of federal foreign rela-
tions law.
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